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Overview
The world economy has experienced the most serious shock since the Second World War. The 
ensuing economic policy responses have been on an unprecedented scale. Their reaction has 
averted a catastrophic spiral and has managed to activate the start of the recovery, although the 
legacy of the crisis will have far-reaching and multi-faceted repercussions. In Spain, the traumatic 
impact of this episode has compounded the difficulties stemming from the imbalances that had 
built up during the previous expansion and from some of the inefficiencies still weighing on the 
economy. Accordingly, exiting the crisis will be a complex task posing specific challenges.
This chapter addresses the main difficulties Spain faces in emerging from the crisis and the 
economic policy requirements this imposes. The following chapter, which complements this 
chapter with a more selective theme-based approach, delves into the medium-term problems 
related to potential growth and supply-side policies.
Over the course of 2009 the world economy underwent the biggest contraction since the end of 
the Second World War (see Chart 1.1). In annual average terms, global growth stood at around 
-0.6%, as a result of the decline in the GDP of the developed economies (-3.1%) and of the strong 
slowdown in output in the emerging economies (by around 4 pp to 2.3%). Inflation rates fell off to 
more moderate levels, or even turned negative in the case of the advanced economies, further to 
cheaper commodities and to the deterioration in the economic situation, which also dimmed any 
flicker of inflationary pressure over the relevant time horizon for monetary policy.
The growth profile over the course of the year was, however, one of mild recovery. This was thanks 
above all to the rapid and forceful economic policy response, which managed to check the negative 
feedback loop between the real and financial sectors into which the world economy had entered. 
Although the measures adopted were not simultaneous across the different regions, they were gen-
erally aimed at providing support to the financial system, to sustaining agents’ confidence and to 
boosting aggregate demand. The first quarter of 2009 saw a continuation of the trends marking the 
close of 2008, namely extreme fragility on international financial markets and a marked decline in 
economic activity and foreign trade. But in Q2 there was a turnaround and growth resumed positive 
rates in the second half of the year. The recovery, nonetheless, is uneven across the different geo-
graphical areas, proving more robust in the emerging countries (especially Asia) and weaker in the 
developed economies.
The stabilising action of economic policies was also discernible in the financial markets, which 
tended to normalise as governments’ and central banks’ resolute action managed to head off the 
more extreme risks. Volatility and risk-aversion declined significantly from their peak in late 2008, 
asset prices picked up and certain segments of the capital markets progressively re-opened, 
having remained closed when the crisis was at its worst. Nonetheless, the process of normalisa-
tion was interrupted on several occasions by episodes of instability, related in some cases to the 
perception of sovereign risk, which evidence the persistence of certain factors of fragility. These 
episodes heightened markedly in the opening months of 2010 in the wake of the Greek fiscal 
crisis and its repercussions on financial markets not only in Europe but also worldwide. 
The forecasts available point to a central scenario in which private-sector autonomous de-
mand should progressively take up the baton from the eminently temporary (exceptionally 
expansionary economic policies and changes in the inventory cycle) and, therefore, insuffi-
ciently sound foundations on which the recovery has hitherto been based. As a result, growth 
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2 The world economy’s 
emergence from the crisis
Following the biggest 
contraction since the end of the 
Second World War...
... the world economy appears 
to have embarked on a path of 
recovery, strongly supported by 
the swift and forceful economic 
policy response
The stabilising action of 
economic policies was also 
discernible in the financial 
markets, which tended to 
normalise
Forecasts point to a progressive 
recovery in private-sector 
demand, which would provide a 
sounder basis for more 
dynamic activity...
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will continue strengthening during 2010 and 2011, although the debt that has built up will 
weigh on private-sector demand. That augurs a slow exit from recession and levels of eco-
nomic activity substantially below potential which, in turn, has also been adversely affected by 
the crisis. Inflation will hold - at least in the developed countries - at very moderate rates, con-
sistent with the overcapacity generated by the crisis.
However, the uncertainty and risks surrounding this outlook remain high. The severe shocks 
at the root of the crisis have exposed significant vulnerabilities on the balance sheets of finan-
cial institutions, companies and, in certain cases, households. Absorbing these imbalances 
may prove slower than the central scenarios envisage. The repercussions of the Greek fiscal 
crisis reveal that the risks associated with a possible resurgence of financial tension, with 
adverse consequences for growth and employment, have not been fully overcome. Also, the 
uneven spread of the recovery across regions may affect commodities prices or the volatility 
of exchange or interest rates in ways other than those considered in the central scenarios.
The soundness of the recovery will also hinge on governments’ and central banks’ ability to 
suitably regulate the pace of withdrawal of the exceptional measures adopted and to draw the 
pertinent lessons from this crisis and duly undertake the necessary reforms.
... but the uncertainty and risks 
surrounding this outlook are 
high
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After using - and using up in the case of the developed countries - the room for manoeuvre 
available in conventional monetary policy conduct, and against a background in which distor-
tions persisted in relevant segments of the transmission mechanism, central banks implement-
ed exceptional measures aimed at reinforcing the transmission of interest-rate cuts to agents’ 
financial costs and at easing their accessibility to financing. As a result, their balance sheets 
expanded notably and the composition of their assets changed. Depending on the respective 
operational frameworks from which central banks departed, the innovations entailed an in-
crease in the number of institutions with access to central bank funding, the extension of the 
collateral acceptable in monetary policy operations, the lengthening of the maturities at which 
liquidity was supplied to the market, and public and private asset purchase programmes (or 
loans to the private sector for the purchase of such assets). Some of these support measures 
were gradually withdrawn as the markets progressively normalised, although the pressures as-
sociated with the Greek crisis meant some had to be reactivated. In any event, the absence of 
inflationary pressures on the immediate horizon eases matters, although it would be hazardous 
to underestimate the risks which, in the medium term, might arise from the earlier mentioned 
uneven pace at which the recovery is spreading across the different regions or from potentially 
insufficient headway in consolidating public finances. Nor can it be ruled out, a priori, that the 
lessons of this crisis may advise retaining some of the measures adopted.
Indeed, the extraordinary measures adopted and the subsequent volume of funds committed 
have been on an unprecedented scale, exhausting all available room for manoeuvre and giving 
rise to a marked deterioration in public finances. As necessary as these measures were to 
reduce uncertainty over the long-term solvency of financial institutions and to boost aggregate 
demand, they now clash with the need to ensure the medium-term sustainability of public fi-
nances. It is essential that governments should prevent the build-up of risks in the public sec-
tor from ultimately disanchoring inflation expectations and raising long-term interest rates, with 
the subsequent harm for growth and employment that would entail. The design and imple-
mentation of budget consolidation strategies which, without jeopardising the incipient recov-
ery, allow healthy public finances to be achieved in the medium run, are today the main chal-
lenges fiscal policy faces in most developed economies.
Governments also face other challenges in the financial area. It is important that the deleverag-
ing processes under way in a good number of financial systems should be orderly, thereby 
avoiding potential accidents that might endanger the availability of the funds needed to sustain 
the pick-up in demand. The financial crisis has also highlighted various flaws in the design of 
financial regulation. The first steps to correct these deficiencies, within an appropriate frame-
work of international coordination, have begun to be taken in the G20 and the Financial Stabil-
ity Council (see Box 3.3). But much remains to be done in designing a regulatory framework 
that reinforces the system’s overall security without unduly hampering its development.
The euro area economy was likewise affected by the aforementioned trends. The recession 
was especially acute in 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1. Thereafter, the effects of the forceful monetary 
and fiscal policy measures adopted, the change in the inventory cycle, the stabilising of inter-
national financial markets and the recovery in the world economy - with the subsequent pick-
up in international trade flows - all combined to temper the downturn in domestic spending 
and to boost exports, despite the fact that the euro appreciated over the course of the year. 
Accordingly, although GDP shrank by 4% over the year as a whole, it posted low but positive 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates in the second half.
Inflation developments were largely determined by the course of commodities prices on inter-
national markets, against a background of sluggish demand and further excess productive 
Adjusting the withdrawal of the 
unconventional measures to the 
ongoing normalisation of 
financial markets is a major 
challenge for monetary policy in 
the short term
For fiscal policy, the main 
challenges are the design and 
implementation of budget 
consolidation strategies that 
help restore health to public 
finances in the medium term
And the consequences of the 
crisis for the optimal size of the 
financial sector and its 
regulation have yet to be drawn
3 Monetary policy in the 
euro area
The euro area has shared the 
main characteristics described 
above for the world economy
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capacity. Inflation averaged 0.3% for the year, although it posted negative rates in the summer 
months that rose in the final stretch of the year and in the opening months of 2010 (1.4% in 
March 2010).
The forecasts available point to a period of slow recovery, weighed down by the high degree 
of slack in the economy (low capacity utilisation and high unemployment), low business mar-
gins, the necessary restructuring of private-sector balance sheets and the progressive waning 
of the impulse of the policies applied, all factors which will check the pick-up in consumption 
and private productive investment. Growth will also be uneven across the euro area countries. 
Against this backdrop, prices will continue moving at notably contained rates.
The risks and uncertainties surrounding these forecasts remain high. The final scale of the re-
covery in the world economy and trade, the effects on commodities prices and on the global 
imbalances built up before - and insufficiently corrected during - the crisis, and the headway in 
normalising international financial conditions will undoubtedly influence the dynamism of prices 
and activity in the euro area. And so too will the decisions that the fiscal and monetary au-
thorities have to adopt, in a particularly complex setting.
The absence of inflationary pressures in the medium term, set against the notable downturn in 
economic activity, led the Eurosystem to adhere to the accommodative monetary policy stance 
it had initiated in October 2008, progressively cutting official interest rates until they reached 
1% in May 2009. A total of 325 bp was thus shaved off rates in seven months, marking a 
monetary impulse on an unprecedented scale.
At the same time, to mitigate the dysfunctions the global financial crisis caused in interbank 
markets and, therefore, in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the Eurosystem con-
tinued adopting new unconventional expansionary measures which prolonged the enhanced 
credit support policy initiated at the end of the previous year. Unlike other central banks, these 
measures were aimed exclusively at the banking system, the importance of which in the inter-
mediation of financing in the euro area is notably greater than in other regions.
More specifically, the demand for funds in all open-market operations continued to be met in 
its entirety, the expanded list of eligible collateral was extended (to late 2010) and the Euro-
pean Investment Bank was included as an additional counterparty. Furthermore, three new 
operations maturing at 12 months (double the previous maximum term in force) were con-
ducted. In the first of these tenders a record amount of €442 billion was injected. Mention 
should also be made of the start-up in July of a covered bonds purchase programme, aimed 
- inter alia - at improving the liquidity of this market segment, which was strongly affected by 
the crisis and is of great importance for the funding of banks and their customers. An envis-
aged maximum sum of €60 billion will be allocated to the programme, which will run until June 
2010.
This set of measures has helped the marked easing of the monetary policy stance progres-
sively pass through to the rates applied by banks on their lending and deposit operations. In 
addition, it has meant that the Eurosystem, in the face of the virtual non-functioning of the in-
terbank markets, has directly met the gross liquidity needs of individual institutions, later mop-
ping up the subsequent excess on top of the system’s net structural needs through drainage 
operations or via the deposit facility. As a result, there was a substantial expansion in central 
bank balance sheets which was, however, less than in other regions, and which began to be 
reversed when the first signs of financial normalisation started to emerge, by means of the 
straightforward procedure of not rolling over operations on their maturity.
The forecasts available point to 
a period of slow recovery, with 
low inflation and subject to 
substantial risks and uncertainty
The contribution of monetary 
policy has been pivotal in 
stabilising the economy, by 
substantially cutting official 
interest rates...
... and offering generous 
liquidity-provision and other 
unconventional expansionary 
measures
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The financial normalisation initiated in the second half of 2009 and the brighter economic out-
look accompanying it allowed the ECB to announce, at the end of the year, the progressive 
interruption of its 12-month and 6-month extraordinary refinancing operations, and the re-
sumption at the original monthly frequency of 3-month operations. Later, in March 2010, the 
return to the system of variable-rate tenders for 3-month operations was announced. How-
ever, faced with renewed market pressures arising from the Greek crisis, the ECB decided to 
reinforce once more liquidity provision at three and six months and to resume US dollar opera-
tions. And, at the same time, it adopted a programme based on intervention in the government 
and private debt markets whose dysfunctionality was jeopardising the normal operation of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. These interventions are being sterilised so as not to 
affect the monetary policy stance and not to interfere with expectations about the future course 
of official interest rates.
Accordingly, the single monetary policy is facing major challenges as to how to regulate the 
return to a normalised operational framework. This first involves preventing the excessive 
prolongation of the exceptional measures that might generate risks to price stability, but 
further entails avoiding interfering in the ongoing normalisation of international financial 
markets. In addition, the appropriate lessons should also be drawn from this crisis, al-
though it should be said that the original operational framework has proven to be suffi-
ciently flexible and robust, meaning that, at least a priori, far-reaching changes do not ap-
pear necessary.
In the medium term, the biggest challenges appear to be associated with the need to cali-
brate the risks to price stability, in a scenario of slow growth and high uncertainty, which will 
also hinge greatly on the measures implemented in other economic policy areas. The Greek 
fiscal crisis has highlighted how the ongoing normalisation of the financial system may yet be 
subject to occasional tensions that hamper attempts to meet the demand for credit that will 
be generated when the pick-up in activity takes root. But, above all, it has illustrated the pres-
sures to which insufficient headway in the announced fiscal consolidation programmes might 
give rise.
Fiscal policy also contributed decisively to halting the dangerous spiral of real and financial 
deterioration by means of discretionary measures to support specific industries (such as the 
financial sector and car manufacturing) and more general demand-boosting measures (some 
of which extend to 2010), and through the free operation of the automatic stabilisers. But 
these measures have exhausted the room for manoeuvre available and have given rise to an 
unprecedented deterioration in the euro area countries’ public finances, which must now be 
redressed. On European Commission January 2010 estimates, the euro area budget deficit 
stood in 2009 at 6.3% of GDP, the highest figure recorded in recent decades and one far 
above that of 2% for 2008. Thirteen euro area countries have an excessive deficit and the 
debt/GDP ratio has also moved onto a path of marked growth, and is expected to stand at 
around 84% of GDP in 2010, compared with 69.4% in 2008. Nor can it be forgotten that these 
figures do not factor in the contingent liabilities associated with population ageing or those 
incurred under the plans providing assistance to the financial system.
Under these conditions, it is vital that governments should lay down ambitious and credible 
fiscal consolidation plans to eliminate uncertainty over the sustainability of public finances. 
These plans should seek to act on the supply side of the economy (in particular on employ-
ment and saving incentives), and also on innovation and enhanced human capital. Experience 
also shows that the most successful fiscal consolidation processes have been those based 
more on spending cuts than on tax increases.
The pace at which the 
exceptional measures are 
deactivated is being regulated 
so as not to jeopardise price 
stability or interfere with the 
process of financial 
normalisation
In the medium term, the 
assessment of the risks to price 
stability will still have to be 
made in a setting of 
considerable complexity
Fiscal policy has also 
contributed decisively to 
cushioning the downturn in 
activity, but there has been a 
very swift and sharp increase in 
the budget deficit and in debt
In light of the fiscal imbalance 
that has built up, a transparent 
and credible strategy of 
medium-term budgetary 
consolidation must be adopted
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On the basis of the Ecofin recommendations in November 2009, all countries in an excessive 
deficit situation would have to undertake a major consolidation drive, at the very latest, from 
2011. The measures envisaged in the updated Stability and Convergence Programmes pre-
sented at the start of this year were a step in the right direction. But the Greek fiscal credibility 
crisis added a further factor of pressure that clearly highlighted how necessary it was to estab-
lish sufficiently ambitious and credible fiscal consolidation commitments, and what the costs 
of not doing so might be for the countries concerned and for the euro area as a whole. This 
episode has also exposed certain procedural weaknesses in economic policy governance in 
the euro area and shortcomings in crisis resolution mechanisms, which must be revised and 
corrected. In the case of the former, to prevent the build-up of imbalances which, while prima-
rily and fundamentally affecting the economy involved, have adverse consequences too for the 
area as a whole that must be taken into consideration. And in the case of the latter, to reinforce 
the soundness of the euro area. 
The European authorities have responded decisively and forcefully to these challenges. Firstly, 
they agreed on a programme of assistance for Greece, the initial scope of which was ex-
tended to envisage an amount of up to €110 billion. This programme was activated at the re-
quest of the Greek authorities, once they had adopted an ambitious and credible fiscal con-
solidation programme agreed previously with the EC, the IMF and the ECB. Later, in May, in 
light of worsening tension and uncertainty, national governments’ and European institutions’ 
commitment to stability in the area was further reinforced by the establishment of the Euro-
pean Stabilisation Mechanism. This programme’s scope was much broader (it could be in-
creased up to €750 billion) and was agreed on by the Ecofin at its extraordinary meeting on 
9-10 May. As in the previous case, the strict conditionality of the assistance is a centrepiece of 
the arrangement. In parallel to this greater aggregate effort, several national governments - 
including Spain - have taken additional steps to accelerate and shore up their individual fiscal 
consolidation programmes.
Complementing these actions is the start-up of a process to review economic governance 
mechanisms, in light of the lessons that may be drawn from this crisis. While the process is still 
at an early stage, the main areas on which changes may be expected to focus are already 
discernible. The preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact may require some strengthen-
ing, with greater relevance being accorded to matters relating to the sustainability of public fi-
nances. It would also seem reasonable to move ahead and design better and more effective 
incentives and mechanisms to ensure stricter compliance with budgetary commitments. Also 
likely is an extension of the framework for multilateral surveillance of economic developments 
so as to cover all macroeconomic and competitive imbalances and to establish a systematic 
procedure for their diagnosis and monitoring, and for greater ex-ante coordination of eco-
nomic policies. Into the medium term, regard must also be had to the request of the Heads of 
State and of Government for a permanent mechanism to be set in place for the resolution of 
potential future bouts of tension, which ensures the necessary financial assistance, subject 
always to a principle of strict conditionality.
Finally, the crisis has made the need to push through twin-pronged structural reforms more 
pressing. First, there is the sphere of financial regulation and supervision, where the aim is to 
prevent circumstances such as those that triggered the current situation, with the necessary 
coordination in the aforementioned international fora. In this respect, the headway made in 
creating the European Systemic Risk Board and the European System of Financial Supervisors 
is to be welcomed. Further, on 3 March the European Commission set out its proposal to re-
new the Lisbon Strategy, namely the Europe 2020 strategy, thereby initiating the process that 
should lead to the approval of this reform by the European Council in mid-2010. The proposal 
To round off the economic 
policy response, structural 
reforms are needed to prevent 
fresh financial crises and to 
increase the economy’s 
efficiency and productivity
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identifies three priorities (for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth), which are expressed as 
specific goals in terms of increasing levels of employment and of investment in R&D, and of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, school drop-out rates and the share of the population 
not having completed tertiary education, and alleviating poverty. Mechanisms are also envis-
aged to strengthen European economic governance. The strategy should contribute more 
decisively than its predecessor to driving the introduction of a series of structural reforms, the 
need for which to sustain growth rates and higher and more sustainable employment is all the 
more pressing after the crisis.
The Spanish economy underwent a marked contraction in 2009, with the decline in GDP av-
eraging 3.6% for the year, the biggest fall in activity in recent decades. These developments 
were in step with the severity of global contractionary trends, though they were also influenced 
by the imbalances that had built up during the previous expansionary phase. The stabilisation 
of financial markets and the recovery under way in some economies, along with the effect of 
the fiscal stimuli applied during the crisis and of interest rate cuts, allowed for some easing in 
the declining path of activity from Q1. The result at the end of the year was a cut in GDP of only 
0.1 pp in terms of the quarter-on-quarter rate (3.1% when compared with 2008 Q4). The re-
cession in Spain has, therefore, been extensive, and in the first half of 2010 growth has re-
sumed sluggishly and with some delay compared to most of the industrialised countries.
The forecasts available point to a weak and gradual recovery, and one not free from major 
challenges. Beyond the doubts over global recovery, which naturally affect the Spanish econ-
omy too, exiting the crisis in Spain poses particular difficulties as a result of the imbalances that 
had built up during the previous expansionary phase, the correction of which will influence how 
growth will resume. These imbalances had taken the form of an excessive concentration of 
resources in the real estate sector, high private-sector debt and risks to competitiveness, as a 
consequence of a decade of cost and price rises outpacing those of the euro area coupled 
with lacklustre productivity. The upshot had been a high external deficit and a continuous in-
crease in external debt. Subsequently, the crisis prompted an extraordinary increase in unem-
ployment and a swift rise in the budget deficit and in public debt, which have compounded the 
imbalances that must be redressed in order to move back onto a sustained growth path.
This set of factors has meant that the recession in Spain has shown a series of distinctive 
features. These include most notably the significant role that the decline in domestic expendi-
ture has played in the contraction in output (national demand fell by 6.1% in 2009), driven by 
the fall-off in household consumption (-4.9%) and by the decline in residential investment 
(-24.5%), which were joined, with some delay, by corporate productive investment. Converse-
ly, net external demand made a positive contribution of 2.8 pp to GDP growth, softening - as 
in previous contractionary phases - the impact of the fall in domestic spending on activity. 
Behind this positive contribution in particular, in a year in which trade flows were subject to 
major convulsions, lies the reduction in imports, dragged down by the contraction in final de-
mand, although exports regained some momentum in the final months of the year. If the ex-
cessive relationship traditionally observed between final demand and imports does not change, 
it will be crucial, as domestic spending stabilises and the growth rate of imports rises, for the 
share of exports in world trade to increase. And that, given the stable exchange rate setting of 
the euro area, is a very demanding aim.
The abrupt containment of domestic expenditure has provided for a reduction in the nation’s 
net borrowing, which fell from 9.1% of GDP in 2008 to 4.7% of GDP in 2009. A factor that 
particularly contributed to this was the correction of the trade deficit, owing to the significant 
fall in imports (see Chart 1.2). The other current account items running a deficit in recent years 
4 The challenges Spain 
faces to emerge from the 
crisis
In 2009 the Spanish economy 
saw the biggest fall in activity in 
recent decades, although the 
declines in GDP progressively 
slackened over the course of 
the year
The forecasts available point to 
a weak and gradual recovery, 
and one not free from difficulties
The recession in Spain has 
evidenced singular features: the 
sharp decline in domestic 
expenditure...
... which has contributed most 
significantly to reducing the 
nation’s net borrowing in terms 
of GDP...
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP 3.3  3.6  4.0  3.6  0.9  -3.6
Private consumption 4.2  4.2  3.8  3.6  -0.6 -4.9
Government consumption 6.3  5.5  4.6  5.5  5.5  3.8  
Gross capital formation 5.2  6.5  8.3  4.3  -3.9 -15.0
Equipment investment 5.1  9.2  9.9  9.0  -1.8 -23.1
Construction investment 5.4  6.1  6.0  3.2  -5.5 -11.2
Housing 5.9  6.1  6.2  3.0  -10.3 -24.5
Other construction 5.0  6.2  5.8  3.3  -0.4 1.6  
Exports of goods and services 4.2  2.5  6.7  6.6  -1.0 -11.5
Imports of goods and services 9.6  7.7  10.2  8.0  -4.9 -17.9
Total employment 2.7  3.2  3.3  2.8  -0.6 -6.7
Employed labour force (d) 62.0  64.3  65.7  66.6  65.3  60.6  
Unemployment rate 11.0  9.2  8.5  8.3  11.3  18.0  
Compensation per employee 3.0  3.7  4.0  4.5  6.1  3.7  
Unit labour costs 2.4  3.3  3.3  3.8  4.6  0.4  
GDP deflator 4.0  4.3  4.1  3.3  2.5  0.2  
Consumer price index (12-month % change) 3.2  3.7  2.7  4.2  1.4  0.8  
Consumer price index (annual average) 3.0  3.4  3.5  2.8  4.1  -0.3
Consumer price differential with the euro area (HICP) 0.9  1.2  1.4  0.7  0.9  -0.5
Resident sectors: saving (f) 23.5  22.9  22.6  21.5  20.2  20.3  
General government (f) 3.1  4.5  5.7  6.0  -0.1 -6.7
Resident sectors: investment 28.3  29.5  31.0  31.1  29.3  25.0  
General government 3.4  3.6  3.6  4.1  4.0  4.5  
Resident sectors: domestic net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) -4.8 -6.5 -8.4 -9.6 -9.1 -4.7
General Government -0.4 1.0  2.0  1.9  -4.1 -11.2
General government gross debt 46.2  43.0  39.6  36.2  39.7  53.2  
ECB minimum bid rate on MROs 2.0  2.0  2.8  3.9  3.9  1.2  
Ten-year government bond yield 4.1  3.4  3.8  4.3  4.4  4.0  
Synthetic bank lending rate 4.0  3.8  4.6  5.7  6.2  3.8  
Madrid Stock Exchange General Index (DEC 1985 = 100) 859.9  1,060.2  1,324.0  1,631.8  1,278.3  1,042.4  
Dollar/euro exchange rate 1.2  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.4  
Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (h) 100.7  100.8  101.1  102.3  104.1  104.0  
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (i) 106.4  108.8  111.6  115.0  118.5  114.6  
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro area (i) 105.1  107.4  110.0  112.5  113.8  109.3  
Cash and cash equivalents 11.3  14.4  11.5  -2.9 -3.2 8.5  
Liquid assets (l) 5.9  11.5  8.5  8.4  9.8  1.0  
Households: total financing 20.2  20.9  19.6  12.5  4.4  -0.3
Non-financial corporations: total financing 13.2  21.4  27.9  17.7  7.9  -0.9
MONETARY AND 
FINANCIAL 
INDICATORS (g)
SAVING, 
INVESTMENT 
AND FINANCIAL 
BALANCE (e)
EMPLOYMENT, 
WAGES, COST 
AND PRICES (c)
DEMAND AND
OUTPUT (b)
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)  TABLE 1.1
SOURCES: INE, Intervención General del Estado, AMECO and Banco de España. 
a. The National Spanish Accounts data are calculated on the basis of base year 2000. 
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have also been corrected to some extent, while the tourism surplus has declined. Overall, the 
reduction in the external deficit has a substantial cyclical component; a permanent correction 
of the deficit will require far-reaching changes in the productive structure and a significant im-
provement in competitiveness.
From the standpoint of the financial position of the institutional sectors, the adjustment reflects 
only partly the significant improvement in the lending capacity of the private sector which, since 
the start of the crisis, has raised its saving and reduced its investment, since general govern-
ment borrowing requirements have increased considerably. The improvement in the private 
sector’s lending capacity from 2007 to 2009 amounted to 18 pp of GDP, with a relatively similar 
contribution by households and firms. As a result of this process, the net lending capacity of 
households for 2009 as a whole was equivalent to 7.1% of GDP, while the corporate sector 
balance remained in deficit (2.2% of GDP), albeit for a much lesser amount than in 2008.
The decline in domestic demand influenced the course of inflation, whose rate of increase 
dipped most significantly during the year, affected too by the fall in energy product prices. The 
fall in the CPI averaged 0.3% in 2009. The easing off in prices was greater than in the euro 
area, meaning that inflation differentials were negative practically throughout the year, an un-
precedented development since the start-up of EMU (see Chart 1.3). The reduction in core 
inflation further to the fall in non-energy industrial goods prices and to the moderation of prices 
of services (where the biggest progress relative to the euro area has been made) reflects an 
increase in the sensitivity of prices to the cyclical situation and, possibly, changes in price-
setting processes. It is of paramount importance that such changes become entrenched, 
since they make a most valuable contribution to improving competitiveness and to the recov-
ery of growth. For the remainder of 2010, price moderation is expected to continue, against a 
background of sluggish spending, despite the possible impact of the VAT increase from July.
The most negative differential feature of the Spanish economy’s performance during the crisis 
has been the intensity of job destruction (-6.7% on average for the year) and of the increase in 
the unemployment rate (up to 20% in 2010 Q1). These figures evidence a forceful labour mar-
ket response to the contraction in activity, one more intense than in other European countries 
and which involves more acute labour market outflows than in previous recessions. Despite 
the cyclical downturn, real wages rose markedly, although their impact on unit labour costs 
was softened by the increase in productivity, largely due to job destruction.
Another aspect that has become increasingly important as the recession has extended has 
been the deterioration in public finances. The economic contraction has undermined tax bas-
es, causing a sharp reduction in revenue takings, and it has quickened spending on unem-
ployment benefits and on other items linked to the cycle. But, in addition, the exceptional 
stimulus measures adopted by the government in the face of the depth of the recession, in line 
with the steps taken globally, have given rise to a large-scale fiscal impulse that is greater than 
that in other developed countries and is contributing to widening the fiscal imbalance. In com-
bination, these factors have reduced the public revenue/GDP ratio by 6.4 pp since 2007 (to 
34.7%) and have raised the expenditure ratio by 6.7 pp (to 45.9%), taking the budget deficit in 
2009 to a record figure of 11.2% of GDP. Public debt stood at 53.2% of GDP, compared with 
its low of 36.2% two years earlier.
The complexity of the factors underlying the recession in Spain have significant consequences 
for the recovery of a path of sustained growth. This chapter tackles, firstly, those aspects of 
the adjustment that are of most importance for anchoring the recovery; specifically, the ab-
sorption of the excess capacity in the real estate sector, the normalisation of credit flows, the 
... and to altering the dynamics 
of inflation, which posted 
negative figures for most of the 
year, influenced too by the fall in 
energy prices compared with 
prior-year levels
But the most negative feature of 
the Spanish economy during 
the crisis has been the scale of 
job destruction and of the rise 
in unemployment
And public finances have 
worsened severely as a result of 
the sharp contraction in activity 
and the exceptional stimulus 
measures
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labour market response and the adjustment of domestic expenditure. Next, the economic 
policy requirements emerging from the situation described are set out, leaving for the following 
chapter a more in-depth and analytical assessment of the medium-term problems related to 
potential growth and to the role supply-side policies must play in tackling them.
One of the singular features of the contraction in Spain is the severe adjustment in the real estate 
sector. During the boom period, which ran for almost a decade, the combination of very generous 
financial conditions, property appreciation expectations, a substantial improvement in future in-
come prospects and an extraordinarily dynamic demographic environment boosted the expansion 
of the sector to what would prove excessive levels, both from the standpoint of the productive 
resources assigned to real estate production and of its valuation and the debt tied to residential 
activity. This made an adjustment inevitable and necessary. It began to unfold gradually before the 
financial crisis broke in mid-2007, and was driven by the change in the ECB’s monetary policy 
stance during 2006 and by the downward revision of property appreciation expectations. How-
ever, the intensity of the crisis meant that the risks of a severe adjustment suddenly materialised.
Activity in the sector has fallen sharply, with a decline in the residential investment/GDP 
ratio of 2.3 pp to 5.2% since the peak of the cycle in 2006-2007. This figure is below 
the average level of the past two cycles, and has entailed a drastic loss of jobs and 
4.1 THE REAL ESTATE 
ADJUSTMENT
The real estate sector 
adjustment, which began 
gradually, has turned sharp...
... bearing down chiefly on 
activity in the sector and, to a 
lesser extent, on prices
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prompted a significant knock-on effect on other productive branches. Despite the inten-
sity of the contraction, the adjustment has not yet concluded. On the production side, 
and due to the lag between housing starts and completions, the overhang in the sector 
continued to increase during 2009, albeit at an increasingly lower rate. The absorption 
of this overhang will require some time; the longer it takes, the greater the delay in the 
recovery in demand or in the completion of the adjustment in prices. Also, it will restrict 
the potential contribution to growth of residential investment, which will hold below its 
average historical levels. The price correction has been less sharp, with property prices 
falling by around 12%, depending on the sources taken, although this is an area in 
which the quality of the statistics is not yet commensurate with the significance of the 
sector. While less sharp, the correction has diminished the value of real estate wealth. 
And this, combined with the effect of unemployment and with the loss of confidence, is 
contributing to holding back private consumption and to an increase in the saving rate 
(see Box 5.1).
The continuation of the adjustment in the real estate sector until completion will detract 
from spending in the coming quarters, thereby limiting the scope of the recovery in the 
Spanish economy in the short run; but it is a key element for providing a sounder basis for 
economic dynamism.
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Given the role that recourse to bank debt has in the financing of pri-
vate-sector spending decisions, and in a setting like the present in 
which these liabilities are contracting, analysis of the outlook for this 
variable is particularly relevant when assessing the Spanish econo-
my’s possibilities of recovery. It may be useful in this connection to 
begin by reviewing the relationship between credit and the business 
cycle in comparable past episodes. In this respect, Panel 1 shows 
the marked procyclical nature of credit. Specifically, in economic up-
turns it tends to grow at a higher rate than that of GDP, which reflects 
the fact that during these periods households and firms generally 
have favourable expectations about their future income, meaning that 
their readiness to resort to debt to finance their spending increases. 
Those supplying these funds during such phases tend to approve the 
attendant applications to a greater extent, as they usually perceive 
fewer risks in respect of borrowers’ solvency. In phases of lower eco-
nomic growth, the same forces operate in the opposite direction, 
BOX 1.1THE OUTLOOK FOR CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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BOX 1.1
meaning that the dynamism of debt diminishes with greater intensity 
than that of output, growing at a lesser pace for some time, which 
allows debt ratios to decline and agents’ solvency to improve. Thus, 
for instance, in the 1992-1993 recession credit reached its low for the 
cycle (the date of lowest expansion) three quarters after GDP did, and 
it was subsequently growing less than GDP for almost three years 
(see Panel 1).
These cyclical effects are clearly apparent in the latest credit develop-
ments, where the economic crisis has been accompanied by a strong 
slowdown in these liabilities. Notwithstanding, at end-2009 credit was 
continuing to grow at a rate which, though negative, was still higher 
than that of nominal GDP. The simple extrapolation of past behaviour 
would suggest that, even in a scenario of economic recovery, bank 
financing should grow for some time at a rate below that of output. 
Moreover, if the patterns of previous cycles recur, the point of maxi-
mum contraction in this variable would not yet have been reached.
But apart from the traditional cyclical factors, credit over the coming 
quarters will foreseeably also respond to other factors related to cer-
tain adjustments needed in the financial position of both the private 
sector and the financial system. Regarding the former, the debt ratio 
of households and firms, which departed from a lower level than that 
of other developed economies, came to exceed the related average 
ratio for the euro area and the United States, standing close to that of 
the United Kingdom (see Panel 2), although in the case of house-
holds a comparatively greater portion of these liabilities was used to 
finance house purchases. This excess leverage, in any event, will 
tend to restrict the demand for resources, given the lesser relative 
scope of households and of firms to withstand the obligations associ-
ated with new liabilities, especially in a setting in which the dynamism 
of their income is not likely to recover swiftly. These factors will also 
bear down on the supply of loans insofar as this situation adversely 
affects the solvency of borrowers.
The need for private-sector balance sheets to be adjusted will fore-
seeably be greater for certain groups of agents, such as companies 
linked to the real estate sector, where the excesses accumulated 
have been greater and the correction is as yet incomplete. As can be 
seen in Panel 3, real estate companies were, prior to the crisis, the 
recipients of a significant proportion of the new financing allocated to 
productive activities, without any reduction in outstanding volumes of 
debt - something that can be seen in the other branches - having 
been observed yet. In the household sector, the growth of credit dur-
ing the years prior to the crisis, while most considerable, did not 
reach such high levels, and it was moreover used chiefly for house 
purchases (see Panel 4).
The financial system, which withstood the first wave of the interna-
tional financial crisis better than intermediaries in other countries, has 
more recently been increasingly affected by the impact of the eco-
nomic crisis on the quality of their portfolios. Specifically, the doubtful 
assets ratio, which had been standing at what were historically very 
low levels, has risen rapidly, albeit without having yet exceeded the 
1992-1993 recession levels (see Chart 5). As a result, the margins 
available have progressively diminished. Thus, the doubtful assets 
coverage ratio fell from 260% in 2006 to less than 60% at end-2009. 
Consequently, it cannot be ruled out that further impairment of credit 
portfolios may be reflected to a greater extent than hitherto in falling 
profits. This impact of the crisis, moreover, is proving heterogeneous 
across institutions, as illustrated, for example, by the high dispersion 
of doubtful assets ratios (see Chart 6). There is hence a need to un-
dertake the redimensioning of this sector, a need to which the higher 
levels of capital required by markets and regulators will also contrib-
ute. Against this background, credit supply conditions can not fore-
seeably be significantly eased.
In sum, although difficulties hampering the recovery in credit may per-
sist in the short term, over a longer horizon the adjustments will pro-
vide for the reinforcement of the financial system’s soundness, which 
is a prerequisite for effective financial intermediation that contributes 
positively to the growth of activity and of employment. The duration 
and intensity of the phase of sluggish bank lending will depend, in any 
event, on the speed at which households and firms, on one hand, 
and the financial system, on the other, complete the adjustments un-
der way.
THE OUTLOOK FOR CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont´d)
Credit to households and Spanish corporations, which posted respective growth rates of 20% 
and 30% at the top of the credit cycle, has fallen to a growth rate of practically zero in the former 
instance, and has turned clearly negative (around -5%) in the latter case (see Chart 1.4).
It is not easy, however, to isolate the specific contribution made by each of the factors re-
sponsible for this change. On one hand, the information sources that explicitly distinguish 
between the demand-side and supply-side components underlying the behaviour of credit 
are limited and are based on surveys reflecting subjective opinions. On the other, and more 
fundamentally, the very cyclical situation of the economy simultaneously affects applications 
for funds and the conditions under which institutions are prepared to meet them. In particu-
4.2 THE CONTRACTION IN 
CREDIT
Credit to households and firms 
has entered a contractionary 
phase as a result of a complex 
set of factors
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lar, a crisis situation entails a downward revision of private-sector spending plans (and there-
fore less demand for financial resources). But, at the same time, a crisis restricts the ability 
to pay, thereby reducing solvency, which translates into stricter supply conditions. Such 
tightening, moreover, is likely to affect households and firms heterogeneously and, among 
the latter, size will be a further factor. If, as has occurred in this case, an economic crisis 
coincides with an international financial crisis, the diagnosis difficulties multiply. Nonethe-
less, viewing recent developments in credit with a sufficiently broad timespan offers very 
significant aspects for understanding the role credit is playing in this cyclical phase of the 
Spanish economy.
The cyclical peak as regards credit behaviour was approximately at the end of 2006, and 
therefore some time ahead of the start of the crisis. The slowdown in bank loans thus re-
sponded, at first, to predominantly idiosyncratic factors, including primarily the very exuber-
ance of the expansion in debt. Credit growth rates of 20% or 30% were unsustainable, and 
made for household and corporate debt ratios which, though they departed from relatively low 
levels, swiftly exceeded the averages for the other developed countries (see Chart 1.2).
Another specific factor was the marked concentration of bank loans in the house building, 
property development and house buying sector. As evidence amassed on the overdimension-
ing of this sector, downward pressures began to emerge on both the supply of funds by insti-
tutions increasingly exposed to this source of risks and on the demand for funds by overin-
debted agents facing the prospect of subdued real estate prices and activity.
The international crisis brought further and likewise contractionary pressures to bear on de-
mand and on credit supply. Spanish household and business confidence fell sharply, as did 
their expectations about future income and, therefore, wealth. This was against a background 
of substantially rising uncertainty, and translated into a strong adjustment of agents’ expendi-
ture plans and, therefore, of the demand for funds with which to finance them.
The increase in uncertainty has been accompanied by a generalised reassessment of the 
level of risk in place in different economies. Before the crisis this level had been clearly un-
derestimated, also by households and firms, whose debt ratios, which may previously have 
appeared tolerable, now proved clearly excessive. This change affected not only their read-
iness to apply for new loans, but also their ability to obtain them, given the greater precari-
ousness of their financial position. In this respect, the correction to date in private-sector 
debt ratios has been limited, even if the conjunctural effect that the 2009 recession has had 
on these ratios is stripped out. Evidently, more buoyant household and corporate income 
would contribute positively to mitigating the contractionary effect of this factor on credit sup-
ply and demand.
The reassessment of risks also affected financial intermediaries, who are more rigorous in their 
pricing of risks and who face, in turn, more demanding markets. Spanish credit institutions 
withstood the initial onslaught of the international financial crisis from a position of relative 
strength, as a result of the combination of a series of factors. These included most notably the 
high relative weight of their long-term liabilities, which limited their refinancing requirements at 
the most critical points; their business model, which is eminently geared to retail banking and 
relatively unexposed to the losses and liquidity problems associated with the now-infamous 
toxic assets, and which is easier to exploit to increase the depositor base; and the provisioning 
buffers built up as a result of a prudential regulatory and supervisory system that is more de-
manding than in other countries. Evidently, the gradual normalisation of international financial 
markets has also contributed to easing the pressure on credit supply.
Prior to the crisis various 
contractionary forces were 
already at play, on both the 
loan-demand and loan-supply 
sides...
... and these were compounded 
by the adverse effects of the 
international crisis on spending 
plans...
... and on borrowers’ solvency...
... and also on the optimal 
leverage and size of the 
financial sector
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Nonetheless, the duration of the crisis and, above all, its effects on the Spanish economy 
have progressively eaten away at the buffers available, in a setting in which the leverage 
levels acceptable to markets and regulators will tend to be lower. Hence the need to pursue 
the redimensioning of the sector, the effect of which on credit supply will tend to be all the 
greater the swifter and more orderly this process is. The challenges here are greater for 
banks that took on more risks during the upturn in the credit cycle, and a more resolute at-
titude is now expected on their part so that they may appropriately exploit the possibilities 
at hand to ensure the efficiency of the process. To this end, significant regulatory changes 
have been made that have substantially broadened the means and tools available to adapt 
and restructure banks, by means of the new framework provided by the creation of the 
FROB (Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector). The reforms introduced, 
with wide parliamentary backing and the prescriptive approval of the European authorities, 
have allowed the process to be set in train through the start-up of several bank integration 
processes. As usual, these matters are addressed in greater depth in the Report on Banking 
Supervision in Spain and in the Financial Stability Report, but are also tackled on a broader 
level in Box 6.1 in this Report.
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Past patterns of credit behaviour show the marked procyclicality of this variable, which in pre-
vious comparable episodes has tended to recover with some delay compared with economic 
activity. On this occasion, future bank loan developments will also be influenced by the need 
of both credit institutions and of households and firms to rise to the restructuring challenges 
set out in this section (and which are analysed in greater detail in Box 1.1). Successfully nego-
tiating these challenges will be vital to prevent distortions from arising in the functioning of the 
financial channels, as such distortions may hamper the resumption of a sustainable path of 
output and employment growth.
But as regards overcoming the crisis, the biggest source of difficulties stems from the inten-
sity job destruction has reached (over 2 million people since employment was at its highest, in 
2007 Q3) and the rise in unemployment (standing at over 4.6 million people in the opening 
months of 2010; see Chart 1.5). Labour shedding has affected disposable income most ad-
versely and, by extension, domestic spending. But it has also exerted a most unfavourable 
effect on confidence and expectations, amplifying the contractionary tendencies of spending. 
The continuation of such a situation, in which any recovery in employment were to take time 
and labour prospects failed to improve, would be a major obstacle to the resumption of growth 
and to the adjustment of public finances.
The scale and speed at which job destruction has come about are proving far greater than in 
previous recessions. The characteristics of the previous cyclical phase, which was very intensive 
in generating employment and evidenced substantial biases in respect of sectoral composition, 
may have influenced this behaviour to some extent. Nonetheless, the only explanation for the 
severity of the adjustment is the persistence of serious institutional shortcomings in the workings 
of the labour market, which had remained latent during the upturn, against a background of far-
reaching demographic changes and alterations in the composition of labour supply, but which 
have deployed all their effects as the crisis has unfolded. These shortcomings mean that the la-
bour market adjustment falls disproportionately on employment, and most particularly on tempo-
rary employment, the share of which in total employment fell to 24.4% in 2009 Q4.
The deterioration in employment expectations ultimately affected the rate of increase of labour 
supply (with some delay compared with past experiences), as a result of the sharp slowdown 
in the working-age population, caused by the reduction in net migrant inflows and by the 
lower pace of the participation rate. Despite diminished demographic buoyancy, the unem-
ployment rate climbed to 20% of the labour force in 2010 Q1. The rise in unemployment af-
fected the different population segments unevenly; the groups most affected were males, im-
migrants and youths, particularly those with a lower level of educational attainment, for whom 
the unemployment rate reached 52.2% in the opening months of 2010. The increase in unem-
ployment is entailing a significant rise in the rate of long-term unemployment. The absorption 
of labour surpluses from construction and the emergence of processes of hysteresis will entail 
difficulties that raise the risk of unemployment becoming structural. The materialisation of this 
risk would be an obstacle to recovery and would have adverse consequences for the pros-
pects for potential growth, which would be further diminished by the foreseeably low long-term 
growth of labour supply, as analysed in Chapter 2.
The decline in domestic expenditure has been on a particularly large scale in Spain. This has 
been due, in part, to the significant reduction in residential investment, as earlier discussed; but 
also of importance has been the contraction in consumption which, for the second year run-
ning, has been the domestic demand component that has most contributed to the decline in 
GDP.
Future credit developments will 
be influenced by the habitual 
cyclical behaviour of this 
variable and by the restructuring 
process affecting lenders and 
borrowers
4.3 JOB DESTRUCTION
But as regards overcoming the 
crisis, the biggest source of 
difficulties stems from the 
intensity job destruction has 
reached...
... which is bearing down chiefly 
on temporary employment ...
... and has led to a very sudden 
increase in the number of 
unemployed, which has 
impacted certain groups 
particularly seriously
4.4 THE DECLINE IN DOMESTIC 
EXPENDITURE
The magnitude of the 
contraction in domestic 
expenditure has been 
considerable
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During the adjustment phase disposable income maintained a positive - although moderate - 
growth rate, underpinned by the sizable transfers of income from general government, lower 
interest payments and the moderation of prices, which offset the strong fall-off in wage in-
come. Wealth has fallen above all as a result of the decline in real estate prices. Nonetheless, 
the downscaling of household expenditure plans during this phase has exceeded what the 
trend of these determinants might have led to expect. Other factors, such as the tightening of 
lending standards, households’ perception about the need to restore health to their financial 
position, and the downturn in confidence and in future income expectations (aspects closely 
tied to the labour market situation) are also playing a decisive role in the contraction of house-
hold spending. Only by having regard to these considerations may an explanation be found for 
the rapid increase in the saving ratio, which stood at 18.8% of disposable income at the end 
of the year, marking a historical high.
Business investment also reacted sharply, with an unprecedented fall of 20% for the year as a 
whole. This was amid highly adverse global conditions for this type of expenditure, both because of 
the demand outlook and the contraction in profits (which, however, is being eased by the reduction 
in financial charges, unlike in previous recessionary cycles) and because of the tightening of financ-
ing conditions. As a result of this disinvestment process, the economy’s capital stock has been 
eroded, with potential implications for long-term growth that are analysed in the following chapter.
Looking ahead, private-sector spending decisions will be influenced by the need to reduce the 
still-high level of leverage in a setting in which the scant dynamism of income will slow the cor-
rection of debt ratios in the short term. To achieve substantial improvements in the financial 
position of households and firms will require moderate consumption and investment patterns, 
but this is a necessary step if the recovery is to be on the basis of a sustainable spending 
path.
Economic recovery in Spain faces major challenges. Only once the excesses in the real estate 
sector have been eliminated and financial restructuring in the private sector is complete may 
The slowdown in income, the 
reduction in wealth, the 
tightening of lending standards 
and uncertainty over job 
prospects have prompted a 
decline in consumption
Business investment has fallen 
sharply
An improvement in the sector’s 
financial position is vital for 
restoring spending on 
sustainable bases
5 Economic policies
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 PERMANENT 
 TEMPORARY 
 TOTAL 
% 
EMPLOYEES 
Year-on-year rate and contributions 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 LABOUR FORCE 
 EMPLOYMENT 
 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
YEAR-ON-YEAR PERCENTAGE CHANGE  IN THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE  
Contributions of labour force and employment 
% 
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT (a)  CHART  1.5 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. 
 
a. The EPA series are linked on the basis of the 2005 Q1 control survey and the 2001 change in the 
definition of unemployment. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 ANNUAL REPORT, 2009 1. OVERVIEW
domestic expenditure resume sustained growth. The financial restructuring of the private sec-
tor should, moreover, run in parallel with the restructuring of credit institutions, so that financ-
ing flows are sufficient to support households’ and firms’ spending plans. But above all, the 
Spanish economy’s traditional structural problems - whose effects are being felt particularly 
sharply during the recession - must be resolved, as they restrict the capacity for adjustment 
and for long-term growth within the euro area. Here, economic policies have an important role 
to play.
The absence of supporting factors in respect of demand-side policies and the need to lift the 
obstacles hampering growth capacity in the medium and long term mean that supply-side 
economic policies play a crucial role in exiting the crisis and in the recovery of potential growth. 
On the monetary policy front, the foreseeable recovery in activity in the euro area will perhaps 
lead to some gradual normalisation of interest rates, which remain at all-time lows, meaning 
that additional stimuli to those already in place would not be appropriate. Nor is there any room 
to apply expansionary fiscal measures, as the fundamental challenge involves, as analysed 
below, giving structure to the programme announced to restore budgetary stability and the 
sustainability of public finances in the medium term. Accordingly, the main area for economic 
policy conduct lies in the structural measures and reforms that provide for job creation, in-
crease competitiveness, improve efficiency and corporate profitability, and help, all told, to 
restore spending on solid foundations and to obtain a flexible and efficient response by pro-
ductive resources.
Fiscal policy has made a great effort to counter private-sector contractionary impulses through 
the free play of the automatic stabilisers and the adoption of very large-scale discretionary 
measures, some of which are temporary. Nonetheless, the Spanish budget deficit is emi-
nently structural, as it is due, above all, to a permanent loss of revenue as a result of the redi-
mensioning of the real estate sector. This in turn has compounded a rising trajectory in spend-
ing that is outpacing trend growth. Accordingly, a fiscal consolidation to check the rapid 
deterioration in debt dynamics is unavoidable. The fiscal effort required in this connection, in a 
situation in which the forecasts available point to a moderate growth scenario, is very great 
and may become more demanding depending on the course of interest rates. Testifying to this 
are the latest developments on financial markets, in particular the sovereign debt markets, 
triggered by the Greek fiscal credibility crisis and the contagion effect towards other vulnerable 
economies, and by the effects of the crisis on the economy’s potential growth (see Box 1.2). 
Mention must also be made, more into the medium term, of the impact on the deficit and debt 
of the cost of population ageing, which, in the absence of reforms to the public pension sys-
tem, will be one of the highest in the EU according to the estimates available.
The arguments that make fiscal consolidation a pressing need are manifold. First, high deficit 
levels and growing rates of public debt may entail interest rate rises, especially when the mar-
kets are alerted to the possibility of fiscal crises occurring in some countries and to these 
spreading tension across the bond markets. This risk has begun to materialise already in the 
euro area, in the wake of the Greek fiscal crisis. It has led the government bond spreads of the 
most vulnerable countries to widen significantly, in spite of their different fiscal positions and of 
the fact that the nature of their risks is not on a par with those of Greece. Second, the signifi-
cant dynamic effects of the fiscal deterioration must be taken into account. When this is very 
swift, the financing of the significant increases in the interest burden poses the harsh dilemma 
of cutting primary expenditure or raising taxes, with both options exerting adverse effects on 
growth, although these will generally be greater in the long run if the second option is taken. 
Finally, a high level of public debt reduces the capacity of fiscal policy to respond to future 
adverse shocks. In this respect, the Spanish experience, at the start of the crisis, is illustrative 
Supply-side policies play a key 
role in exiting the crisis and in 
the resumption of growth in the 
medium run
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According to the updated Stability Programme (USP) presented on 
29 January by the Spanish government, general government debt is 
expected to increase by 38 pp of GDP between 2007 and 2013, in a 
benign scenario for economic growth and the interest burden. Al-
though the level of Spanish public debt was below the European Un-
ion average in 2009, the risks associated with the strong inertial com-
ponent of this variable should not be forgotten. Specifically, once 
public debt reaches high levels, it is difficult to break the trend unless 
significant budgetary adjustments are made. This Box illustrates 
these aspects drawing on the definition of various alternative sce-
narios for the path of Spanish public debt to 2013, constructed using 
alternative assumptions of GDP growth, interest rates and fiscal ad-
justment.
A change in the public debt/GDP ratio from one year to the next de-
pends on four fundamental factors. First, on the level of the primary 
public balance, whereby a negative balance in this variable translates 
into an increase in debt of the same amount. Second, on nominal 
GDP growth: positive (negative) growth gives rise to a reduction (in-
crease) in the debt/GDP ratio. Third, on the interest payments on 
public debt that have to be financed. And, fourth and finally, on the 
debt-deficit adjustment, which reflects, inter alia, the need to finance 
the acquisition of financial assets.
To illustrate the relative significance of each of these factors, it is use-
ful to analyse the role each played in the process of public debt re-
duction that began in the 1990s in Spain and which allowed for a 30 pp 
cut in the public debt/GDP ratio between 1995 and 2007. This period 
saw an adjustment to the primary balance of the order of 0.8% of 
GDP a year from 1994 to 1999, and of 0.2% from 2000 to 2007. 
Conducive to this adjustment were high nominal GDP growth rates, 
which averaged over 7% in the 1994-2007 period, and the favourable 
trend of interest rates, which fell by 4 pp over the same period (see 
accompanying panel).
To assess the impact of these same factors on debt dynamics over 
the coming years, various scenarios are considered that take as a 
basis the projections for each of these variables envisaged by the 
USP. The first scenario considers the public debt projection of the 
USP’s central scenario, adjusted for the new public deficit path ap-
proved by the Spanish government on 20 May 2010 (“Central 
scenario”)1, in which average nominal GDP growth stands at 3.4% in 
the 2010-2013 period, the average implicit interest rate on debt is at 
around 4% and the adjustment of the primary public balance is 2.4 pp 
of GDP on average between 2010 and 2013. The second scenario is 
obtained by jointly considering the two risk factors of the USP (“risk 
scenario”), which involves assuming lower average nominal GDP 
growth in 2010-2012, of the order of something over 0.5 pp com-
pared with the central scenario, and interest rates 1 pp higher than 
those of the base scenario.2 Thirdly, in addition to the assumptions of 
the previous scenario, it is assumed that the fiscal adjustment made 
in each year of the 2010-2013 period is lower and, specifically, similar 
to the average adjustment made in the last fiscal consolidation proc-
ess (adjustment of the primary balance of 0.8% of GDP). Finally, to il-
lustrate the risks that not undertaking a budgetary consolidation proc-
ess would entail, the last scenario assumes that the primary balance 
holds at the 2009 levels in the 2010-2013 period. It should be noted 
that, in the last two scenarios, what is purely an accounting exercise 
is performed, with the remaining assumptions of the USP being re-
tained.
In the central scenario the debt ratio would stabilise at a level of close 
to 70% of GDP in 2013. The USP risk scenario would raise the public 
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debt ratio in 2013 to 75% of GDP, 5 pp above the base scenario, 
which highlights the significance of the behaviour of the macroeco-
nomic variables for debt dynamics. Finally, both the “non-consolida-
tion” scenario and the “similar consolidation to the 1990s” scenario 
show that, if the adjustment is on a limited scale or delayed, debt 
might rapidly rise to very high levels.
Beyond 2013, it is worth considering some further factors of risk that 
might affect public debt over the longer term. These relate chiefly to 
population ageing, given the current and projected demographic 
structure. Specifically, on the basis of common demographic and 
macroeconomic assumptions made by the Working Group on age-
ing, of the EU Economic Policy Committee, ageing-associated 
spending as a percentage of GDP is estimated to increase by 9 pp 
over the 2007-2060 period. Against this background, the need to see 
through fiscal consolidation is all the more pressing.
The simple exercises presented in this box help illustrate the risks 
associated with the build-up of public debt, even when the starting 
point is a low level when compared with the EU average. Given the 
fiscal situation in 2009, with a deficit of 11.2% of GDP, the fiscal ad-
justment is absolutely necessary if it is sought to avoid excessive 
public debt growth. Furthermore, the fiscal adjustment should be on 
a most significant scale and one far greater than that undertaken 
between 1993 and 2007. This is because the starting fiscal situation 
is now also more negative and the interplay of GDP growth and inter-
est rates will foreseeably not be conducive to reducing the public 
debt/GDP ratio, unlike the case in the previous fiscal consolidation 
period. Naturally, higher-than-expected GDP growth in the scenarios 
presented in this box would have beneficial effects for public debt 
dynamics, which highlights, also from this perspective, the impor-
tance of undertaking the structural reforms needed to improve the 
economy’s growth potential.
BOX 1.2FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND PUBLIC DEBT DYNAMICS IN SPAIN (cont´d)
of the room for manoeuvre that the starting position of public finances provided, which advo-
cates restoring a healthy budgetary position as soon as possible.
Fiscal consolidation faces the difficulty of pursuing the dual goal of effectiveness in order to 
reduce the budget deficit and stabilise debt, and of minimising its potential adverse effects on 
growth in the short term. Past experience shows that the best means of negotiating such a 
situation is to focus the consolidation drive on cutting current expenditure, although given the 
scale of the budget shortfall, resort must inevitably be had also to increasing resources through 
the taxes that generate least distortion. To do this, clear and transparent fiscal rules will be 
needed, using the full range of provisions offered by our institutional framework: namely, the 
Budgetary Stability and the Stability Programme Laws, as newly conceived, which will provide 
for more effective mechanisms to ensure compliance with the commitments made.
In Spain, once expansionary conduct had run its course, the best contribution fiscal policy 
could make to growth was via the rigorous implementation of the fiscal consolidation plan 
within the term set by the Stability and Growth Pact. The government undertook to pursue a 
fiscal consolidation programme, in accordance with the November 2009 Ecofin recommenda-
tions, whose guidelines were given specific form in the updated Stability Programme unveiled 
in January this year. The Programme acknowledged the existence of a high structural deficit 
and aimed to reduce it in the period 2010-2013, placing the deficit at 3% of GDP at the end 
of the projection horizon. This would be on the basis of a marked cut in public spending, al-
though the projected macroeconomic scenario taken was relatively benign, meaning that 
compliance might require additional efforts to those envisaged, as formulated by the Ecofin 
Council in its opinion on the updated Stability Programme.
Subsequently, as part of the moves to reinforce governments’ and European institutions’ com-
mitment to stability in the area before the tension generated by the Greek fiscal crisis wors-
ened, the Spanish government adopted a more ambitious fiscal consolidation programme on 
20 May. It sought thereby to avert a deterioration that would have had grave consequences for 
the economy and for euro area stability. The programme frontloads a sizeable portion of the 
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reduction in the deficit in 2010 and 2011, when it would stand at 6% of GDP, and it involves a 
series of measures that act directly on the structural component, which might be cut by more 
than half, as described in Chapter 5 of this Report. This austerity drive by the government is in 
response to the exceptional nature of the situation and to the wish to redress public finances. 
In any event, it is vital to ensure that the objectives are strictly implemented, since any deviation 
will give rise to significant credibility problems. To ensure strict compliance, it will be necessary 
to reinforce monitoring and surveillance procedures, to seek formulas that ensure compliance 
with the objectives laid down, particularly in the case of territorial governments, and to redress 
the dynamics of certain spending items.
In circumstances like the present, and given the demands the situation poses, the adoption of 
pension system reforms, in line with the government’s proposal, is particularly timely; this al-
lows for an improvement in the long-term sustainability of public finances without generating 
adverse effects on short-term growth.
The main instrument available to national authorities to boost long-term growth prospects is 
that of structural reforms. These are all the more pressing after the crisis, as it is vital to resolve 
as soon as possible the inefficiencies that the crisis highlighted. This will call for some of the 
institutional frameworks in place and rooted practices to be changed.
The behaviour of employment during the current cyclical phase indicates that the Spanish la-
bour market’s pre-crisis adjustment mechanisms are not working properly, since they have the 
weight of the adjustment fall excessively on employment. This type of response reveals the 
presence of major labour relations deficiencies, and this is very costly from the standpoint of 
long-term economic growth and social well-being.
Excessive labour market segmentation (stemming from the coexistence of a very high degree 
of protection for employees with a permanent contract and of a wide range of temporary con-
tracts with very low termination costs) determines high costs for stable hiring and job stability, 
and leads labour mobility to be concentrated, almost exclusively, on a very large group of 
workers with temporary contracts, who have scant training and recycling options open to 
them. The collective bargaining system tends to exacerbate, moreover, some of the conse-
quences of labour market segmentation by encouraging uniform wage increases, which show 
scant cyclical sensitivity and are highly indexed to past inflation. It is a system which, on the 
whole, largely prevents relative wages from acting as a signalling mechanism for the realloca-
tion of resources towards sectors with greater development potential.
It is therefore a priority to overhaul labour market institutions through reform that simultane-
ously influences collective bargaining systems and hiring arrangements and which, at the 
same time, reinforces training and intermediation systems. That would allow for better job re-
assignment across companies and sectors, it would increase the economy’s capacity for ad-
justment in the face of shocks and it would help promote a change in the productive model 
that has prevailed over the past business cycle.
The regulation of the housing market - in particular of those aspects that have hampered the 
development of the rental segment - coincided with the gestation of one of the biggest imbal-
ances that built up during the economic upturn and it also gave rise to substantial adjustment 
inefficiencies during the recession. Measures promoting the development of the rental market 
would contribute to providing an outlet for the stock of unsold housing, to smoothing access 
to accommodation and to promoting the regional mobility of workers. Various such measures 
were approved in 2009, including most notably the announcement of a series of initiatives 
In the current situation, pension 
reform is particularly timely
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aimed at increasing legal efficiency in rental-related cases, and certain aspects of the Lease-
hold Law were amended. However, the main features of this law relating to mandatory con-
tract duration and to rent control have been retained. The draft sustainable economy legisla-
tion, which is in passage through Parliament at the time of this report going to press, and 
which has been designed to boost long-term growth, proposes a way forward in the re-bal-
ancing of the tax treatment of rented and owner-occupied housing. Turning to services, the 
easing in final prices over the course of the past 18 months reflects a substantial increase in 
the cyclical sensitivity of these prices, which may be partly due to changes in price-setting ar-
rangements in increasingly competitive environments. The most specific progress in structural 
reforms has in fact been aimed at the liberalisation of the sector and at the reduction of admin-
istrative burdens. In this respect, headway was made in 2009 in the transposition of the Serv-
ices Directive, with the aim, among other aspects, of providing free access to the provision of 
specific services and of reducing administrative burdens. It will be attempted to deepen both 
avenues of reform with the Sustainable Economy Law. Nonetheless, the persistence of obsta-
cles to the free pursuit of certain activities, such as retail trade, remains discernible.
As to the network industries, the effects of the liberalisation processes of the past decade are 
most visible in the telecommunications sector, although some segments remain in which cer-
tain rigidities are still perceptible, and these are of vital importance for harnessing the advan-
tages provided by the development of the information society. In the energy industry, despite 
the numerous regulatory changes made with greater liberalisation in mind, the degree of de 
facto competition is far from what it should be if the sector is to be able to deploy its potential 
synergies to the rest of the economy. Effective improvements in the competitive environment 
in which energy companies operate must therefore be achieved, in line with the European 
Commission’s recommendations. Finally, in the transport industry, the draft sustainable econ-
omy legislation includes various measures to increase competition in the intercity passenger 
transport market and to foment railway transport through, for example, the improved intercon-
nection of different modes of transport.
Finally, the reform of the education system and the re-design of incentives for a greater accu-
mulation of technological capital would also contribute to raising the efficiency of factors of 
production and, therefore, to increasing the economy’s potential growth. These reforms are 
addressed in greater detail in the following chapter, which also analyses in depth the obstacles 
posed by the institutional design of labour relations to a prompt and sustained recovery of the 
Spanish economy.
